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I. INTRODUCTION
Virtually every criminal defense lawyer will be called upon to try
several multiple defendant cases each year. The courts favor such trials
as being more efficient than individual trials.' The prosecution favors
them because defendants against whom the evidence may not be as
strong become more "convictable" when they are tried together with
clearly guilty defendants. Often, defense motions for severance are de-
nied and the defense attorney is forced to try his case with one or more
other attorneys. Despite the strategic problems in multiple defendant
cases, the defendant is not helpless, as a joint trial creates numerous
* Mr. Gaskins practices law in Washington, N.C. J.D., University of North Carolina, 1975;
Law Clerk, Chief United States District Judge, E.D.N.C., 1975-76; Assistant United States Attor-
ney, Criminal Division, E.D.N.C., 1976-78.
This article was developed from materials originally presented at a seminar entitled "Evi-
dence-Techniques and Strategies for the Civil and Criminal Trial Lawyer," sponsored by the
North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers on March 6, 1981 in Greensboro, N.C. The author
and the editors of the North Carolina Central Law Journal are grateful to the Academy for permis-
sion to use those materials in the preparation of this article.
I. The Supreme Court has recognized this as one justification for joint trials: "Joint trials
do conserve state funds, diminish inconvenience to witnesses and public authorities, and avoid
delays in bringing those accused of crime to trial." Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 134
(1968).
1
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evidentiary problems for the prosecution. The defense attorney may
anticipate these problems, advance his clients' arguments forcefully,
and gain leverage with the prosecution that would never be available in
a solo trial.'
II. BAUTON AND THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
In the 1968 case of Bruton v. United States,3 petitioner and a co-
defendant, Evans, were indicted for armed postal robbery. At their
joint trial a postal inspector testified that Evans had confessed that he
and Bruton committed the robbery. Evans did not testify at the trial.
Both defendants were convicted.4 On appeal, the Supreme Court re-
versed petitioner Bruton's conviction. The Court held that the intro-
duction of Evans' statement at the trial violated Bruton's sixth
amendment right to confront the witnesses against him.5 The Court
stated that a major reason behind the confrontation clause of the sixth
amendment6 is to allow a criminal defendant the opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses against him. Bruton was denied this right when
Evans' statement was introduced into evidence and Evans himself did
not testify.
Bruton does not apply when the co-defendant who made the confes-
sion testifies at a joint trial and is subject to cross-examination.7 The
Bruton problem arises when a witness testifies regarding an out-of-
court statement made by a co-defendant that incriminates the defend-
ant. Where the witness is the co-defendant who made the statement,
the defendant will have an opportunity to cross-examine him, and the
2. It is assumed in this article that joint trials are always disadvantageous. Such is obviously
not always true. Many features of a joint trial may dictate a preference for being tried with other
defendants. An obvious factor would be the possibility of pooling peremptory challenges with
other defendants. Another consideration would be the possibility of a mistaken in-court identifi-
cation when the government witness must choose among numerous defendants. Lastly, a defense
attorney may prefer to try the case with a co-defendant when his client's culpability is less than
that of his co-defendant. If the client is convicted, the contrasting degrees of culpability could be
used to mitigate punishment.
3. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
4. Id at 124. Evans' conviction was later reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit. On April 8, 1966, a police officer obtained a confession from Evans during interrogation
without giving Evans any preliminary warnings and in the absence of counsel. The police in-
formed the postal inspector who later obtained an oral confession from Evans expressly implicat-
ing Bruton in the crime. The court of appeals held that both confessions were inadmissible under
Miranda v. United States and Westover v. United States, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Evans v. United
States, 375 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1967). On retrial, Evans was acquitted. 391 U.S. at 124.
5. 391 U.S. at 126.
6. The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him. U.S.
CoNsr. amend. VI.
7. United States v. Howard, 590 F.2d 564 (4th Cir. 1979); Baldwin v. Blackledge, 330 F.
Supp. 183 (E.D.N.C. 1971); State v. Jones, 280 N.C. 322, 185 S.E.2d 858 (1972).
2
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requirements of the confrontation clause will be met.'
Even if the co-defendant who made the incriminating statement is
tried separately from the defendant or is otherwise not subject to cross-
examination at trial, Bruton may be inapplicable to avoid the introduc-
tion of the incriminating statement into evidence. In California v.
Green9 the Supreme Court held that the otherwise valid'" introduction
of a prior incriminating statement will not violate the confrontation
clause if defendant's counsel has an opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant at trial." The Court further stated that the statement would
have been admissible even if the declarant had not appeared as a wit-
ness at the trial because the incriminating statement had been made at
a preliminary hearing where the defendant's counsel had ample oppor-
tunity to cross-examine the declarant."u In Green, sixteen-year-old
Porter was arrested for selling narcotics to an undercover agent. After
he was taken into police custody, Porter named Green as his supplier.
Later, at Green's preliminary hearing, Porter again named Green as his
supplier. Green's privately retained counsel was present at the hearing
and cross-examined Porter extensively. At Green's trial, Porter's testi-
mony was evasive. He testified that he had taken "acid" at the time he
obtained the maijuana and could not remember how he had come by it.
The prosecution used Porter's prior inconsistent statement to "refresh
his memory."' 3  Under the California evidence code' 4 the statement
was admitted as substantive evidence. The California Supreme Court
reversed Green's conviction and held the California evidence statute
unconstitutional under the confrontation clause of the sixth amend-
ment. The United States Supreme Court reversed the California court
and held that the statute was constitutional. Under Green, when a co-
defendant's incriminating statement is introduced, the first question is
whether the statement is admissible under the law of hearsay. If the
answer to that question is no, of course the statement cannot be intro-
duced into evidence. If the statement falls within a hearsay exception,
the next question is whether the statement violates the defendant's
rights under the confrontation clause. If the defendant's counsel has
8. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
9. Id
10. The out-of-court statement was admitted under a California Evidence Code provision
that provides: "Evidence of a statement made by a witness is not made inadmissible by the hear-
say rule if the statement is inconsistent with his testimony at the hearing..." CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 1235 (1966). Out-of-court statements and confessions offered at joint trials are fraught with hear-
say problems and the defense attorney should always attempt to first exclude an out-of-court
statement as hearsay.
11. 399 U.S. at 158.
12. Id at 165.
13. Id at 151-52.
14. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1235 (1966).
3
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the opportunity to cross-examine the witness who made the statement,
there is no violation of the confrontation clause. The opportunity to
cross-examine may exist either at the trial or at the time the statement
was originally made. In Green, since the defendant's counsel had an
opportunity to cross-examine Porter both at the preliminary hearing
when the statement was first made and later at Green's trial, there was
no violation of the confrontation clause.
Bruton has also been held inapplicable when the incriminating state-
ment is admitted at a joint trial but the portion referring to the defend-
ant is effectively deleted,' 5 or when it is admitted at a bench trial.
16
The Supreme Court in Bruton recognized that it may be impossible for
a jury to put evidence they have heard, but should not consider, out of
their minds during their deliberation. Thus, limiting instructions may
be inadequate to protect the defendant once the inadmissible statement
has been presented to the jury. 7 This problem would not arise where
the defendant is tried before a judge sitting as the trier of fact.
Courts have also held that, although Bruton may technically apply,
where the incriminating statement is not "especially incriminating" and
other evidence of guilt is overwhelming, Bruton will not serve to ex-
clude a prior incriminating statement.' 8 In the North Carolina case of
State v. Squire,19 an officer testified at a joint trial for first degree mur-
der regarding an incriminating statement made by a co-defendant.20
The court recognized that the introduction of the incriminating state-
ment violated the Bruton rule because the declarant did not testify at
the trial. The court found that the introduction of the statement, fol-
lowed by a limiting instruction by the trial judge, was harmless error
and did not warrant reversal of the defendant's conviction.2' Quoting
from the Supreme Court case of Lutwak v. United States,22 the court
stated, "Like any other defendant, Seaborn [petitioner] was 'entitled to
a fair trial, not a perfect one.' "23 The court also quoted from the opin-
ion of Justice Rehnquist in Schneble v. Florida:24
The mere finding of a violation of the Bruton rule in the course of the
trial, however, does not automatically require reversal of the ensuing
15. United States v. Grant, 549 F.2d 942 (4th Cir. 1977); State v. Mathis, 13 N.C. App. 363,
185 S.E.2d 450 (1971). See notes 56-57 and accompanying text, infra.
16. United States v. Pickney, 611 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1979).
17. 391 U.S. at 128-29.
18. Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972); Mathews v. Bounds, 367 F. Supp. 77 (E.D.N.C.
1973); State v. Squire, 292 N.C. 494, 234 S.E.2d 563 (1977). See notes 106-07 and accompanying
text infra.
19. 292 N.C. 494, 234 S.E.2d 563 (1977).
20. Id at 506, 234 S.E.2d at 570.
21. Id at 510, 234 S.E.2d at 572.
22. 344 U.S. 604 (1953).
23. 292 N.C. at 508, 234 S.E.2d at 571 (quoting 344 U.S. at 619).
24. 405 U.S. 427 (1972).
4
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criminal conviction. In some cases the properly admitted evidence of
guilt is so overwhelming, and the prejudicial effect of the codefendant's
admission is so insignificant by comparison, that it is clear beyond a
reasonable doubt that the improper use of the admission was harmless
error.
25
The North Carolina court followed the standard of proof set out in
Schneble and held that the record as a whole must prove the error
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
26
A. Pre-trial Procedure in Raising Bruton Questions
The first task is to determine whether there will be co-defendants in
the trial. In North Carolina, that task is easy. Although each defend-
ant must be charged in a separate pleading, the prosecutor must file a
written motion to join two or more defendants for trial.2 7 In federal
court, two or more defendants can be charged in the same indictment
and then tried together.2"
The next task is to determine whether any Bruton-type statements
are in the hands of the prosecution. The following request or one simi-
lar should be in the defendant's request or motion for discovery:
Defendant requests the disclosure prior to trial of any out-of-court
statements by any co-defendant which inculpate or have a tendency to
inculpate him. The production of such statements prior to trial is nec-
essary in order that the defendant may move pursuant to [§ 15A-
927(c)(1)] [Rule 14] for severance.
This request will put the prosecution on notice that the defendant is
seeking Bruton -type statements; if the prosecution does not comply, the
defendant has laid the necessary groundwork for a mistrial. If the
prosecution has such statements, it will undoubtedly produce them;
however, federal prosecutors have the option of submitting the state-
ments to the court in camera for inspection.29
The next step is to file a motion for severance under North Carolina
General Statute section 15A-927(c) or Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. A motion in state court generally must be filed
prior to arraignment. It will be a rare case in which the defendant will
25. 292 N.C. at 508, 234 S.E.2d at 571 (quoting 405 U.S. at 430).
26. 292 N.C. at 510, 234 S.E.2d at 572.
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-926(b) (1978).
28. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8.
29. FED. R. CRIM. P. 14 provides:
If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of
defendants in an indictment or information or by such joinder for trial together, the court
may order an election of separate trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide
whatever other reiefjustice requires. In ruling on a motion by a defendant for severance the
court may order the attorney for the government to deliver to the court for inspection in
camera any statements or confessions made by the defendants which the government intends
to introduce at the trial.
5
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know at the time of arraignment whether there are Bruton-type state-
ments in the hands of the prosecution. As a precaution in cases where
Bruton problems are expected, the defense attorney should file a mo-
tion prior to arraingment asking for extra time to file motions for a
severance. In the motion, a hearing on the issue of severance should be
requested prior to trial.3 °
After the severance motion is filed, the prosecutor has four choices if
the introduction of a statement would violate Bruton: separate trials
for the defendants; joint trial in which the statement is not admitted
into evidence; joint trial at which the statement is admitted into evi-
dence after all references to the moving defendant have been deleted so
that the statement will not prejudice him;3 or joint trial at which the
original statement is admitted without change. If the prosecutor elects
either of the first two, the defendant has usually won a victory. Most
defense lawyers prefer to avoid the problems associated with joint tri-
als, and the exclusion of any inculpating evidence is a victory.
If the prosecutor elects to "redact" the statement and proceed with a
joint trial, the defense attorney is faced with several choices. Should he
or she become involved in the process of cleansing the co-defendant's
statement? Should the court become involved? Or should the burden
be on the prosecutor or his witness?32 The answer depends to a large
extent upon the state of the evidence. If the evidence against the de-
fendant is not overwhelming and a skillful editing of the statement
would remove very damaging evidence, it is often better to do the work
for the prosecutor. The main drawback to active involvement by the
defense attorney is the possibility of approving the introduction of the
redacted statement and waiving errors for appeal. Otherwise, it is best
to let the prosecutor shoulder the burden. It is a rare policeman who
can effectively delete all references to the defendant. Unless the prose-
cutor writes out the script for the witness, the chance of error is high.
B. Procedure at a Joint Trial
If the prosecution has failed to acknowledge that there are Bruton-
type statements in the case and the defense attorney has suspicions to
the contrary, he or she should renew the request for discovery at the
beginning of the trial to protect the record for appeal. Of course, this
again puts the prosecutor on notice that he is about to walk into a trap,
but the defense attorney should err on the side of protecting the record
30. United States v. Glover, 506 F.2d 291, 299 (2d Cir. 1974).
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-927(c)(1) (1978); Close v. United States, 450 F.2d 152 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1068 (1971). See notes 56-57 and accompanying text infra.
32. In State v. Freeman, 28 N.C. App. 346, 229 S.E.2d 238 (1976), the defense attorney re-
viewed the statement with the prosecutor prior to trial. In United States v. Dorsett, 544 F.2d
687 (4th Cir. 1976), the court and the attorneys edited the statement.
6
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so that the prosecution cannot argue on appeal that the defendant
waived a constitutional right.
If there is an acknowledgement of Bruton-type statements and the
prosecutor is proceeding in a joint trial, the motion for severance
should be renewed at the beginning of the trial along with a statement
of the reasons a joint trial may threaten the defendant's rights. An af-
firmative duty is then imposed upon the court to make an inquiry, if it
has not already done so, as to the statements intended to be used and to
decide what remedial steps are required.33 When the inculpating, al-
beit redacted, statement is introduced, a timely objection to the intro-
duction of the statement must be made to protect the record on
appeal.34 Next, the defense attorney should request an instruction that
the out-of-court statement is admissible only against the co-defendant
who made the statement.35 If the limiting instruction is requested, it is
reversible error for the trial judge to refuse to give it.36 The defendant
must renew the motion for severance "before or at the close of all the
evidence" or the error may be waived.37
33. United States v. Truslow, 530 F.2d 257, 261 (4th Cir. 1975). In Truslow, the trial court
denied a motion for severance in a joint trial of three defendants. The court of appeals reversed
the conviction of each of the defendants, stating:
When it is brought to the attention of the trial court in connection with a severance motion
that Bruton problems may be caused by statements of co-defendants to be used in a joint trial,
the court should make inquiry as to the statements intended to be used and then decide what
remedial steps are required. The remedial action may be in the form of the exclusion of the
statements at a joint trial, deletion of references to co-defendants against whom the statement
or statements are inadmissible, or severance.
Since no alternative to severance was considered by the court, the failure to sever requires
reversal.
Id at 261-62. The court of appeals did not instruct the trial court which remedial method it
.should adopt on retrial. Id
34. State v. Wortham, 23 N.C. App. 262, 208 S.E.2d 863 (1974). On appeal to the North
Carolina Court of Appeals, defense counsel in Wortham contended that an objection appearing in
the record was addressed to a long line of testimony preceding the objection. The court of appeals
held that although the testimony should have been excluded under Bruton, failure to make a
timely objection precluded reversal of defendant's conviction on this point. The court stated: "An
objection to incompetent evidence ordinarily must be made as soon as the complaining party has
the opportunity to learn that the evidence is objectionable, and by failing to object in apt time the
party waives the objection." Id at 266, 208 S.E.2d at 866.
35. State v. McEachin, 17 N.C. App. 274, 195 S.E.2d 349 (1973).
36. Where two or more persons are jointly tried, the extrajudicial confession of one
defendant may be received in evidence over the objection of his codefendant(s) when, but only
when, the trial judge instructs the jury that the confession so offered is admitted in evidence
against the defendant who made it but is not evidence and is not to be considered by the jury
in any way in determining the charges against his codefendant(s).
State v. Lynch, 255 N.C. 584, 588, 146 S.E.2d 677, 680 (1966). But see State v. Kessack, 32 N.C.
App. 536, 232 S.E.2d 859 (1977) (court of appeals refused to reverse conviction where no limiting
instruction was requested).
37. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-927(a)(2) (1978); State v. Brown, 300 N.C. 41, 265 S.E.2d 191
(1980). Section 15A-927(a)(2) provides: "If a defendant's pretrial motion for severance is over-
ruled, he may renew the motion on the same grounds before or at the close of all the evidence.
Any right to severance is waived byfailure to renew the motion. " (emphasis added).
7
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C. Other Practice Pointers
1. If the out-of-court statement of the co-defendant implicating the
defendant is admitted at a joint trial, and the co-defendant then takes
the stand testifying favorably to the defendant, Bruton does not apply
even if the co-defendant denies making the out-of-court statement.38
However, the North Carolina Court of Appeals, in State v. Slate,3 9 held
that in such a case the trial court must instruct the jury that the out-of-
court statement is to apply only against the testifying co-defendant.
Failure of the court to give the limiting instruction constitutes revers-
ible error.4"
2. Assume the following facts: A co-defendant gives a statement to
an undercover agent that implicates the defendant in a criminal con-
spiracy. At the joint trial, the co-defendant takes the stand and testifies,
under cross-examination by defendant's attorney, that defendant was
not involved in the alleged crime. The prosecution may then introduce
the incriminating statement to impeach the co-defendant. In Joyner v.
United States,' ' the court of appeals held that, under those facts, sever-
ance was not required. The court reasoned that because the co-defend-
ant was present and testified at the trial, defendant's rights under the
confrontation clause were not violated.42 Moreover, the statement was
admissible as substantive evidence under the common law rule that
statements made by a co-conspirator are admissible against all other
co-conspirators.43 Therefore, it was not necessary for the court to give
an instruction to the jury to use the statement as evidence only against
the testifying co-defendant."4
3. If the out-of-court statement is admissible against the defendant
under some exception to the hearsay rule, some courts have held that
Bruton is inapplicable. In a footnote in Bruton the question was specif-
ically reserved.45 In the first important North Carolina decision after
Bruton, Justice Sharp construed this to mean that Bruton did not apply
if the confession was otherwise admissible against the defendant.'
38. Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971); State v. Jones, 380 N.C. 322, 185 S.E.2d 858
(1972). See text accompanying notes 7-14 supra.
39. 38 N.C. App. 209, 247 S.E.2d 430 (1978).
40. Id at 212, 247 S.E.2d at 432-33.
41. 547 F.2d 1199 (4th Cir. 1977). But see United States v. Payne, 492 F.2d 499 (4th Cir.
1974) (Widener, J., dissenting).
42. 547 F.2d at 1201.
43. Id Although not promulgated at the time this case arose, FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) has
now codified the common law rule. See also notes 70-71 and accompanying text infra.
44. 547 F.2d at 1203.
45. 391 U.S. at 128 n.3.
46. State v. Fox, 274 N.C. 277, 163 S.E.2d 492 (1968). In Fox, Justice Sharp stated:
[I]n joint trials of defendants it is necessary to exclude extrajudicial confessions unless all
portions which implicate defendants other than the declarant can be deleted without
prejudice either to the State or the declarant. If such deletion is not possible, the State must
8
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Numerous North Carolina opinions have followed this rule.47
This interpretation of Bruton by the North Carolina courts should
not be accepted. Although the values served by the hearsay rules and
the confrontation clause are similar in many respects, the overlap is far
from complete.48 The primary reason hearsay rules were developed
was to assure the reliability of evidence.49 On the other hand, the con-
frontation clause was designed to protect the defendant's right to con-
front the witnesses against him. That is the basis of Bruton. The Court
in California v. Green stated that by providing the defendant with a
constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him, the confron-
tation clause:
(1) insures that the witness will give his statements under oath-thus
impressing him with the seriousness of the matter and guarding against
the lie by the possibility of a penalty for perjury; (2) forces the witness
to submit to cross-examination, the "greatest legal engine ever invented
for the discovery of truth"; (3) permits the jury that is to decide the
defendant's fate to observe the demeanor of the witness in making his
statement, thus aiding the jury in assessing his credibility.
50
Although these advantages of the confrontation clause will also serve to
insure the reliability of evidence, if the co-defendant does not testify,
confrontation is denied regardless of whether the goals of the hearsay
rules are met.
In United States v. Alvarez,5 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit addressed the introduction of an out-of-court state-
ment under the hearsay exception .embodied in Rule 804(b)(3) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. That rule allows the admission of an out-
of-court statement if three tests are met: (1) the declarant is unavaila-
ble as a witness at trial; (2) the statement is so far contrary to the de-
clarant's interest or so far tends to subject him to criminal liability that
choose between relinquishing the confession or trying the defendants separately. The forego-
ing pronouncement presupposes (1) that the confession is admissible as to the codefendant, and
(2) that the declarant will not take the stand.
Id at 291, 163 S.E.2d at 502 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
47. State v. Hardy, 293 N.C. 105, 235 S.E.2d 828 (1977) (implied admission when defendant
heard inculpating statement by co-defendant and did not object); State v. Phifer, 290 N.C. 203,
225 S.E.2d 786, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1050 (1976) (implied admission); State v. Conrad, 275 N.C.
342, 168 S.E.2d 39 (1969) (admissible as a statement in course of and furtherance of conspiracy).
In the following cases, the admission of out-of-court statements by co-defendants were held im-
proper but harmless error: State v. Porter, 50 N.C. App. 568, 274 S.E.2d 860 (1981) (spontaneous
utterance); State v. Spaulding, 288 N.C. 397, 219 S.E.2d 178 (1975) (insufficient evidence of im-
plied admission). See also United States v. Roberts, 583 F.2d 1173 (10th Cir. 1979); United States
v. Truslow, 530 F.2d 257, 262-63 (4th Cir. 1975); United States v. Payne, 492 F.2d 449 (4th Cir.
1974) (Widener, J., dissenting).
48. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970).
49. D STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 139 at 464 (Brandis rev. 1973).
50. 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).
51. 584 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1978).
9
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"a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement
unless he believed it to be true"; and (3) if the statement is offered at a
criminal trial to exculpate the defendant, there are corroborating cir-
cumstances that clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
The court in Alvarez held that the sixth amendment requires at a mini-
mum that inculpatory statements (as well as exculpatory statements
mentioned in the federal rule) against penal interest be corroborated by
circumstances clearly indicating the trustworthiness of the statement.
52
Having disposed of the case by its interpretation of Rule 804, the court
did not reach the confrontation issue.
Two years later, in United States v. Sarmiento-Pere,53 the fifth cir-
cuit, relying on Alvarez, held that the custodial confession of a sepa-
rately tried co-conspirator, insofar as it directly implicated the
defendant in the criminal conduct charged, was not trustworthy or reli-
able evidence against the defendant for the purposes of the "statement
against penal interest" exception to the hearsay rule.54 The court in
Sarmiento-Perez stated:
When inculpatory hearsay is sought to be admitted into evidence
under the aegis of a recognized exception to the hearsay rule, the right
to confront and cross-examine the declarant is being asked to yield to
another legitimate interest in the criminal trial process: the recognition
that the trier of fact should be afforded the opportunity to consider rele-
vant hearsay that is suffciently trustworthy. Nevertheless, the conse-
quent denial or diminution of so essential and fundamental a
confrontation value as the opportunity to cross-examine demands that
the competing interest to which that value yields be "closely
examined."55
Under Sarmiento-Perez and Alvarez, when hearsay evidence, admit-
ted under the hearsay exception for statements against interest, conflicts
with the confrontation clause, the court should examine both the evi-
dence and the circumstances surrounding its making to determine if it
is sufficiently trustworthy. to overcome the defendant's sixth amend-
ment right to confrontation. The same argument should also apply to
out-of-court statements that are offered against the defendant under
other hearsay exceptions.
4. If a redacted statement is to be introduced at trial, the defense
counsel should make sure that all references to the defendant have
52. Id at 701.
53. 633 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1980).
54. Id at 1103. The court noted that a reasonable person already arrested and in police
custody may well be motivated to misrepresent the role of others in the criminal enterprise to shift
the blame away from himself. Id
55. Id at 1100.
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been effectively deleted. What constitutes an effective redaction? Con-
sider the following out-of-court statement by a co-defendant:
We had planned to rob the bank for several months. We wanted to rob
it on Friday when there would be more money. John waited outside
while I went into the bank. After I got the money, we drove to my
mother's house.
Assume that John is the defendant and the prosecution intends to
offer the statement through an F.B.I. agent. Which of the following
redactions is applicable?
We had planned to rob the bank for several months. We wanted to rob
it on Friday when there would be more money. [Blank] waited outside
while I went into the bank. After I got the money, we drove to my
mother's house.
or
[I] had planned to rob the bank for several months. [I] wanted to rob it
on Friday when there would be more money. I went to the bank. After
I got the money, [I] drove to my mother's house.
The second alternative is clearly more favorable to the defendant. If
there are only two persons being tried, the first alternative, the use of
the word "blank" in place of the defendant's name, is extremely in-
criminating. The use of "we" likewise invites an association of the de-
fendant and co-defendant. There is nothing in the second alternative
which, standing alone, implicates the defendant. A redaction similar to
the first was used at trial in United States v. Danzey.56 The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals found the introduction of the redacted state-
ment to be prejudicial to both defendants in the joint trial because the
jury would be tempted to "fill in the blank" with the name of the co-
defendant. The court recommended a version of the second redaction,
stating that it would be more in line with the meaning of Bruton.
57
5. In 1979, the United States Supreme Court attempted to restrict
further the application of Bruton in Parker v. Randolph. 8 In Parker,
three defendants gave oral confessions to a police officer after their ar-
rests. At their joint trial, the confessions were admitted into evidence
through police testimony. The Court, in a plurality opinion 59 written
by Justice Rehnquist, held that there is no error in admitting an incul-
pating statement by a co-defendant when the defendant has confessed
and his confession "interlocks" with or supports the confession of the
co-defendant. It must be emphasized that Parker is a plurality opinion.
56. 594 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1978).
57. Id at 918-19.
58. 442 U.S. 62 (1979).
59. Justice Blackmun joined only parts I and III of the opinion. With Justice Powell not
participating in the decision, the Court divided 4-1-3 over section II.
11
Gaskins: Evidentiary Problems in Multiple Defendant Cases: How to Plan for
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1981
MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS
Justice Blackmun, concurring in the result, found that any violation of
Bruton was harmless error under the facts of the case. Justice Black-
mun objected, however, to doing away with the harmless error determi-
nation any time the co-defendants have made interlocking confessions,
as suggested by Justice Rehnquist. Justice Blackmun stated that al-
though the confessions may not be inconsistent, the confession of a co-
defendant may be very incriminating to the defendant even though he
has also confessed. Justice Blackmun recommended that future cases
be decided on a case-by-case basis and that confessions of a co-defend-
ant be excluded unless the error is harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.6°
The dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens marshals numerous argu-
ments that can be used by defense attorneys to distinguish the decision
in Parker. Justice Stevens stated that a per se rule against the applica-
bility of the Bruton doctrine when all co-defendants have given admis-
sible confessions is violative of the defendant's rights under the
confrontation clause. He argued that the plurality erroneously as-
sumed the reliability of the confessions of the co-defendants. He felt a
determination of whether the confession is reliable should be made
before it is admitted. 6' He also stated that the defendant's failure to
take the stand to rebut his own confession should not be a factor favor-
ing the admission of a co-defendant's confession; the defendant's rebut-
tal of his own confession will not dilute the effect of a co-defendant's
confession, and requiring the defendant to take the stand would force
him to relinquish his constitutional right to silence in order to protect
his right to confrontation.62 Justice Stevens pointed out the error in
assuming that, because all co-defendants made confessions, the jury
would be better able to follow the trial judge's instructions to disregard
a co-defendant's confession in evaluating defendant's guilt.63 Finally,
Justice Stevens stated that the plurality disregarded the Bruton doctrine
in ruling that the prejudice to the defendant from the introduction of a
co-defendant's confession was entirely cured if the nontestifying de-
fendant also made an admissible confession. Justice Stevens noted that
the defendant in such a case is still saddled with all the inaccuracies
which may be in the co-defendant's statement without the protection of
cross-examination.
64
6. If a Bruton error occurs at trial, a limiting instruction is ineffec-
tive to erase from the minds of the jury the effects of the prejudicial
60. 442 U.S. at 77.
61. Id See notes 54-55 and accompanying text supra, for a discussion of the applicability of
whether evidence is reliable to the Bruton doctrine.
62. 442 U.S. at 78.
63. Id at 84.
64. Id at 85.
12
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testimony.65  As stated by Justice Jackson in Krulewitch v. United
States,66 "The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be over-
come by instructions to the jury .. all practicing lawyers know to be
unmitigated fiction . . "7 The defense attorney should seek a new
trial whenever a Bruton error has occurred even if the trial judge gave a
limiting instruction.68
7. New trials are rarely granted on the basis of Bruton errors.
There are few North Carolina and fourth circuit opinions granting new
trials.69 Despite the fact that new trials are rarely granted on the basis
of Bruton errors, the case provides a very effective weapon for the de-
fense. There is no way to measure the number of cases in which preju-
dicial joinder has been avoided, damaging evidence excluded, or an
acceptable plea bargain struck because of the Bruton problems faced by
the prosecution. The key to effective use of Bruton remains, however,
the building of a proper foundation prior to and during the trial.
III. CONSPIRACY TRIALS
It is well known that declarations made by co-conspirators in fur-
therance of and during the course of the conspiracy are admissible at
trial, if there is independent proof of the existence of the conspiracy
and the connection of the defendant and the declarant with it. Such
declarations may be used against any member of the conspiracy. 70 The
conspiracy charge has been called the "darling of the modern prosecu-
tor's nursery,' in part because statements made during the course of
and in furtherance of a conspiracy are not considered hearsay. Federal
prosecutors have used the conspiracy offense most effectively in drug
and white collar cases. State prosecutors have not overwhelmingly em-
braced the conspiracy charge, as is evidenced by the relatively few state
decisions on conspiracy.
A. Pretrial Discovery
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and section
15A-903(a) of the North Carolina General Statutes provide that the
65. State v. Singleton, 244 S.E.2d 440 (1978).
66. 336 U.S. 440 (1948).
67. Id at 453 (Jackson, J., concurring).
68. Some violations of Brulon have been considered harmless error by the courts. See notes
106-07 and accompanying text infra.
69. E.g., United States v. Truslow, 530 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1975); State v. Heard, 285 N.C. 167,
203 S.E.2d 826 (1974); State v. McEachin, 17 N.C. App. 634, 195 S.E.2d 349 (1973); State v.
Justice, 3 N.C. App. 363, 165 S.E.2d 47 (1969); State v. Williams, 275 N.C. 77, 165 S.E.2d 481
(1969); State v. Fox, 274 N.C. 277, 163 S.E.2d 492 (1968).
70. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E); 2 D. STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 173 at 24-•
25 (1973).
71. Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925).
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defendant should be provided with a copy of any statement made by
the defendant which will be offered at trial. The conspiracy charge can
provide extra discovery to the defendant because all conspirators are
considered agents of all co-conspirators. The statement of any one con-
spirator is attributable to all other conspirators and admissible at trial
against all other conspirators. Under this theory, the co-conspirators'
statements become the defendant's statement and should be discovera-
ble by the defendant. 2
B. Independent Proof. Practice and Procedure
Before the hearsay will be admissible against a defendant, there must
be sufficient independent evidence of the existence of the conspiracy
and the connection of the defendant and the declarant to it. The fourth
circuit has stated the standard of proof in varying ways. The conspir-
acy need not be proven at the preliminary stage beyond a reasonable
doubt. "The government can discharge its duty by introducing sub-
stantial independent evidence of the conspiracy [or] at least enough to
take the question to the jury."73 Other statements of the standard of
proof have included "prima facie proof of the conspiracy"'" or proof
by a "fair preponderance" of independent evidence.75 In North Caro-
lina, the state must establish a "prima facie" case of conspiracy by in-
dependent evidence before introducing the hearsay statements of co-
conspirators.7 6 The standard of proof is unimportant in most cases be-
cause the prosecution is usually able to establish that a conspiracy ex-
isted. Who will decide this issue and when it will be decided are the
more important questions.
The initial determination of whether the prosecution has presented
sufficient evidence, independent of the hearsay itself, of the existence of
the conspiracy and the connection of the defendant with it will be made
by the trial judge. The question usually arises in the midst of the trial
when the prosecution attempts to introduce a hearsay statement by a
co-conspirator and the defendant objects. What should the judge do
then?
The judge may turn to the prosecutor and say that he has not heard
sufficient independent evidence of the conspiracy and the necessary
72. In United States v. Turkish, 458 F. Supp. 874, 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), the court ordered the
production of all statements made by co-conspirators whom the government did not intend to call
as witnesses. Id The court noted that under 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976), the government need not
produce statements of those co-conspirators who would appear as witnesses at trial. See United
States v. Percevault, 490 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1974).
73. United States v. Anderson, 611 F.2d 504, 510 (4th Cir. 1979) (quoting United States v.
Stroupe, 538 F.2d 1063, 1065 (4th Cir. 1976)).
74. United States v. Vaught, 485 F.2d 320, 323 (4th Cir. 1973).
75. United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 186, 203 (4th Cir. 1976).
76. State v. Miley, 291 N.C. 431, 230 S.E.2d 537 (1976).
14
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connections of the defendant to it. He could then tell the prosecutor to
proceed with his evidence deleting the hearsay. The hearsay would be
admitted only after the necessary showing had been made. This is
clearly the preferred method.v
In the alternative, the judge could ask the prosecutor for a proffer of
the independent evidence which he intends to introduce. In the past,
the judge would have overruled the defense counsel's objection to the
hearsay evidence and given an instruction similar to the following to
the jury:
Members of the jury, the government is presenting evidence of state-
ments made by persons other than the defendant. I instruct you that
you may consider the statements against the defendant if you find from
other evidence independent of the statements that a conspiracy existed
and that the defendant was one of its members, provided such state-
ments were knowingly made by a co-conspirator during the continu-
ance of such conspiracy and in furtherance of some object or purpose
of the conspiracy.1
8
By so doing the court would be allowing the introduction of the evi-
dence upon the promise of the prosecution to "connect it up" with in-
dependent evidence later in the trial.79  If such evidence was
forthcoming, there would be no prejudice to the defendant from the
offer of proof. If, however, the judge concluded at the close of the trial
that there was insufficient independent evidence, no amount of limiting
instruction would erase the hearsay evidence from the jurors' minds.8°
A mistrial on the defendant's motion would then be merited.8'
It now appears that in federal courts the determination of whether
the hearsay should be admitted and considered is solely within the dis-
cretion of the trial court. This radical change, which has occurred in
the past five years, 2 is based on Rule 204(a) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, which provides that preliminary questions concerning the
77. United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 582 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc).
78. In United States v. Apollo, 476 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1973), the court held that such a cau-
tionary instruction was necessary whenever testimony regarding declarations of co-conspirators is
admitted. Defendant's conviction was reversed on the grounds that the conspiracy was estab-
lished by only marginally sufficient non-hearsay evidence. Id at 162-63. In 1979, the fifth circuit
revised the procedures adopted in Apollo. The Federal Rules of Evidence became effective in
1975. Rule 104 allows the admission of evidence subject to the condition that its relevancy will be
established by later evidence. Pursuant to that rule, the court, in United States v. James, 590 F.2d
575 (1979), held that the judge alone should make the determination of whether the hearsay evi-
dence of a conspiracy has been sufficiently established by independent evidence to become admis-
sible. Id at 580. "The jury is to play no role in determining the admissibility of evidence." Id
79. State v. Tilley, 292 N.C. 132, 232 S.E.2d 433 (1977).
80. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
81. United States v. Stanchich, 550 F.2d 1294, 1298 (2d Cir. 1977).
82. United States v. Petroziello, 548 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1977); E. DEVITT & D. BLACKMAR,
FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS, § 27.06 (Supp. 1980).
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admissibility of evidence "shall be determined by the court." 3 Ideally,
however, the court should admit the evidence only if the proper show-
ing has been made. There would then be no need to instruct the jury to
disregard evidence it has already heard.
The en banc decision of the fifth circuit in United States v. James4 is
extremely important to defense attorneys. The majority opinion recog-
nized that the preferred order of proof would be one in which non-
hearsay proof of conspiracy is received first. The court should not re-
ceive any hearsay declarations unless the government has made a
prima facie showing of the existence of the conspiracy and the defend-
ant's involvement with it. The court, however, retains discretion to re-
ceive evidence subject to being connected. If the hearsay evidence is
received subject to being connected up, the defendant may move for
exclusion of the evidence at the close of the government's case in chief.
If the court is unable to find by a preponderance of evidence (1) that a
conspiracy existed, (2) that the declarant and defendant were both
members of the conspiracy and had not withdrawn at the time of the
declaration, and (3) that the declaration was made pursuant to the con-
spiracy, the evidence should be excluded and the court should consider
a new trial.8 5
Although the majority opinion calls for a determination of the ad-
missibility of the evidence at the end of the trial, the concurring opin-
ions in James emphasize that the trial judge has considerable discretion
as to order of proof8 6 The defense attorney should urge the judge at a
pretrial conference to adopt the rule that the hearsay will not be admit-
ted until the existence of the conspiracy and other matters are proven
by independent evidence. If the judge insists on allowing the prosecu-
tion to "connect up" the evidence, the defense attorney should consider
filing a motion for a pretrial determination of such matters, known as a
James hearing. The following language is from such a motion recently
filed in United States v. DiBenedetto:"87
The James en banc decision suggests the propriety of proceeding on
a pretrial evidentiary hearing where there is the suggestion of a great
deal of prejudice being played upon one or more defendants as the
result of proceeding to trial upon the polled representation by govern-
ment counsel that he or she will tie up or connect up a sufficient predi-
cate to admit hearsay statements on a co-conspirator exception basis.
83. See United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 186 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 (1976).
84. 590 F.2d 575 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979).
85. Id at 582-83. When considering whether a new trial is warranted, the judge must decide
whether a cautioning instruction to the jurors to disregard what were hearsay statements can cure
the prejudice arising from the erroneous admission of the alleged co-conspirator's statements im-
plicating the defendant. Id at 583.
86. Id at 583 (Gee, J., concurring); Id at 585 (Tjofiat, J., concurring).
87. No. 81-10 (D.S.C.
16
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Notwithstanding the fact that the court may later admonish the jury
to disregard statements which are judicially determined not to apply to
the defendant, experiences taught that such admonitions or directions
from the court are not only unworkable, but rather enhance the
prejudice by pointing out for a second time the nature of the govern-
ment's proof.
The defendant would respectfully suggest that a pretrial evidentiary
hearing be held at which the government be required to establish its
burden of proof of admissibility by offering testimony as to the partici-
pation of each of the individuals pursuant to the "conspiracy." In this
way, the court can make a decision as to the admissibility of co-conspir-
ator or co-defendant's statements pursuant to Federal Rule of Evi-
dence, Rule 801. This pretrial hearing will also avoid the unnecessary
potential for re-trial if in fact the defendant is prejudiced by his or her
independent acts, deeds, or declarations. It would further avoid unnec-
essary interruptions during the course of the trial for admonitions by
the court pending the government's "tying up" of the proof as to an
individual defendant.
WHEREFORE, the defendant respectfully requests this Honorable
Court to conduct a pretrial "James" hearing.
8 8
The defendant will not always benefit from a pretrial hearing to de-
termine the sufficiency of the independent proof. As noted above, the
defendant usually would prefer to force the prosecution at trial to pro-
duce its independent evidence before the hearsay is admitted. In cer-
tain cases, this procedure will create inordinate problems for the
prosecution. A pretrial hearing may give the prosecution a chance to
"practice" its witnesses and prepare them for actual trial examination.
On the other hand, it may be a discovery device for the defense. It may
also give the defense attorney leverage over the prosecutor. If the pros-
ecution resists the request, ground work is laid for error at the trial. If
the prosecution successfully resists the pretrial hearing and later fails to
present the requisite independent evidence to "connect up" hearsay ev-
idence, after the judge has allowed the presentation of hearsay based
on the representation of the prosecutor that he will do so, the defend-
ant's hand in making a motion to dismiss or for a mistrial is considera-
bly strengthened. The argument is simply that the prosecution
declined to test its evidence in a manner which would avoid any
prejudice to the defendant and should not be held accountable for a
situation of its own making.
The recent case of United States v. Grassi89 illustrates the dislike trial
judges have for pretrial James hearings. The fifth circuit in Grassi ex-
plained the mechanics of a James hearing as follows:
88. Id
89. 616 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1980).
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Evidence submitted at a James hearing for the purpose of proving a
conspiracy must, of course, be free from hearsay objection; otherwise, a
co-conspirator's hearsay might bootstrap itself into admissible evi-
dence. Moreover, in order to protect the defendant from the admission
of prejudicial hearsay on the basis of threadbare evidence of conspir-
acy, the judge must decide at the conclusion of the James hearing
whether the independent eidence linking the defendant to the conspir-
acy is substantial. If a co-conspirator's extrajudicial declaration is ad-
mitted into evidence, the judge must reconsider its admissibility at the
conclusion of the trial. His second decision, however, is to be made by a
higher standard- whether the prosecution, through independent evi-
dence, has demonstrated the defendant's participation in a conspiracy
by apreponderance ofthe evidence. If the prosecution has not prevailed
on this point, the judge must decide whether a cautionary instruction
will cleanse tle record of prejudice or whether a mistrial is required. 90
At the beginning of Grassi's hearing the trial judge "urged the prose-
cution to move quickly and to present no more than the 'threshold ba-
sis for invocation of the co-conspirator rule." 91 Either because of a
lack of evidence or a desire to pacify the judge in a hurry, the prosecu-
tion failed to present substantial evidence of Grassi's connection with
the conspiracy. The fifth circuit refused to consider the incriminating
statements of co-conspirators and dismissed the charge based upon in-
sufficiency of evidence.92
C. Proof of the Conspiracy
Although substantive conspiracy law is outside the scope of this arti-
cle, the rules of evidence are closely connected to such laws and cannot
be separated. In cases involving a conspiracy, the defendant may be
ultimately able to exclude the hearsay statements of co-conspirators
where the prosecution presents insufficient evidence of the defendant's
connection to the conspiracy.
United States v. Stroupe9 3 is an excellent example of the defendant's
use of the rule requiring independent proof of the conspiracy and the
defendant and declarant's connection to it. In that case, government
agents sought to purchase amphetamines from Randy Wright. While
the agents were in Wright's home, he made a phone call to inquire
about purchasing the drugs for the agents. The agents did not identify
the person whom Wright called except that Wright used the name
"Wayne." Wright told the agents the drugs would be available that
afternoon. When the agents later returned to Wright's home he placed
90. Id at 1300 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
91. Id at 1301.
92. Id at 1301-02.
93. 538 F.2d 1063 (4th Cir. 1976).
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a similar call to "Wayne," and told the agents they had to go some-
where else to pick up the drugs. Wright took the agents to a trailer
which Wayne Stroupe leased. He went in briefly, leaving the agents to
wait in the car. Wright then came out with Stroupe and a young wo-
man. When he got back in the car he gave the agents a plastic bag
containing amphetamines and told the agents that Stroupe was his
"supplier." As the agents and Wright drove away, Stroupe waved to
them.94 Stroupe was later charged with several narcotics violations in-
cluding conspiracy to distribute amphetamines. At trial, an agent of-
fered Wright's out-of-court statement as substantive evidence against
Stroupe. The statement was admitted under the conspiracy exception
and Stroupe was convicted.
The government argued on appeal that the evidence was sufficient to
prove the conspiracy so that later statements tying Stroupe to the con-
spiracy were properly admissible. The court found this position "un-
tenable" on the evidence presented by the government. The court
stated that Stroupe's involvement in the conspiracy could only have
been established if Wright's statement was accepted." The opinion is
an unusual example of an appellate court being willing to carefully sift
through the trial evidence. 96
.More recently, in United States v. Gresko,gV the court found insuffi-
cient evidence to connect the defendant with an established conspiracy.
The evidence presented which would have tied the defendant to a con-
spiracy to bribe a public official was the hearsay statement of a co-
conspirator. Since there was no independent evidence to connect him
to the conspiracy, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
hearsay statement was improperly admitted and that a judgment of ac-
quittal should have been granted.
D. Proof of "During the Course of the Conspiracy"
Before the co-conspirator's declaration will be admissible against the
defendant, the prosecution must show that the declaration was made
during the course of the conspiracy. The statements must not be made
prior to the formation of the conspiracy, after the conspiracy has termi-
nated, or after the defendant or declarant has withdrawn. 9s
94. Id at 1064.
95. Id at 1065.
96. The more recent case of United States v. Docket, 659 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1981) involved
facts similar to those presented in Stroupe. But in Docket the court of appeals, in a two page
opinion, merely recited the facts as presented by the prosecution and held that the conspiracy had
been proven by independent evidence. 659 F.2d at 17. Docket demonstrates the general unwill-
ingness of appellate courts to examine carefully the facts of a case.
97. 632 F.2d 1128 (4th Cir. 1980).
98. State v. Tilley, 292 N.C. 132, 232 S.E.2d 433 (1977).
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The prosecution often attempts to introduce statements by co-con-
spirators made after their arrest, arguing that such statements are ad-
missible under the conspiracy exception. This is clearly wrong. The
conspiracy ends for the declarant when he is arrested. The fourth cir-
cuit held in United States v. Blackshire99 that such statements are not
admissible because they are not made in furtherance of the conspiracy
nor during its continuance. However, short of an arrest, courts will not
presume that the conspiracy has ended unless its termination is affirma-
tively shown.' °
E. Proof of "In Furtherance of the Conspiracy"
Practically, this is an extremely difficult requirement to enforce. The
declaration must have been made "in furtherance" of the conspiracy
but need not in fact have advanced the conspiracy. Many courts
equate "in furtherance" with "in the course of."'' Most statements
which are made by a co-conspirator during the course of the conspiracy
will also be found to have been in furtherance of the conspiracy. Re-
gardless, the argument that the statement was not made in furtherance
of the conspiracy should not be overlooked by the defense attorney. It
may be persuasive in some cases.
F. The Conspiracy Exception and the Confrontation Clause
Does the admission of a co-conspirator's statements when the co-
conspirator does not testify violate the confrontation clause? The
Supreme Court has said that a violation of the confrontation clause
may exist even though the statements in issue were admitted under an
arguably recognized hearsay "exception."' 2
Many attorneys have assumed that the Supreme Court decision in
Dutton v. Evans'°3 resolved the issue. In Dutton, the co-conspirator
Williams returned to his cell after arraignment and stated to his
cellmate, Shaw: "If it hadn't been for that dirty son-of-a-bitch Alex
Evans, we wouldn't be in this now." Shaw appeared as a witness at
trial and testified as to that statement. Evans challenged his conviction
on the grounds that the introduction of Williams' statement violated his
right to confront the witnesses against him. The Supreme Court held
that Shaw's testimony concerning the statement did not violate the con-
frontation clause even though Williams did not testify-" Under Geor-
99. 538 F.2d 569, 571 (4th Cir. 1976).
100. Joyner v. United States, 547 F.2d 1199, 1203 (4th Cir. 1977).
101. See United States v. Sapperstein, 312 F.2d 1199, 1203 (4th Cir. 1977).
102. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970). See notes 9-14 and accompanying text
mpra.
103. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
104. Id at 88.
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gia law, contrary to the federal rule, the statements of a co-conspirator
are admissible even if the conspirators are engaged in nothing more
than concealment of the criminal enterprise. 105
The Dutton opinion should not, however, be read as foreclosing ob-
jections to hearsay based upon the confrontation clause. It may well be
limited to the facts of the case. The Court said that the confrontation
clause was not violated because the hearsay evidence was neither "cru-
cial" nor "devastating,"'0 6 because Evans had an opportunity to cross-
examine Shaw, and because there were "indicia of reliability" for the
statement. ' Finally, the Court found that the application of the Geor-
gia rule under the circumstances of the case did not violate the sixth
amendment.' 08 At most, Dutton should be read to indicate that when
the out-of-court statement is not particularly damaging and the circum-
stances of its utterance indicate its reliability, the defendant has the
burden of indicating in what manner the declarant's live testimony
would have prevented the prejudice created by the declarant's absence
at the trial.0 9
The Bruton objection itself is compelling where the co-conspirator
who made the incriminating statement does not testify. The defense
attorney can argue that the court has admitted testimony which may be
entirely unreliable. One commentator has noted the inherent unrelia-
bility of hearsay statements implicating an alleged co-conspirator in the
conspiracy:
The invocation of a name may be gratuitous, may be deliberately false
in order to gain advantages for the declarant greater than those that
would flow from naming a real participant or no one at all, may be a
cover for concealment purposes. . . or may represent an effort to gain
105. GA. CODE § 38-306 (1954), in effect at the time of the decision in Dutton, provided: "Af-
ter the fact of the conspiracy shall be proved, the declarations by any one of the conspirators
during the pendency of the criminal project shall be admissible against all." The Georgia
Supreme Court, on appeal, upheld the introduction of the statement, stating:
The rule is that so long as the conspiracy to conceal the fact that a crime has been committed
or the identity of the perpetrators of the offense continues, the parties to such conspiracy are
to be considered so much a unit that the declarations of either are admissible against the
other.
Evans v. State, 222 Ga. 392, 402, 150 S.E.2d 240, 248 (1966).
106. Other reasons offered by the Court for finding no violation of the confrontation clause
were that there was no misuse of a confession, neither prosecutorial misconduct nor negligence, no
use of a paper transcript, and the case did not involve a joint trial. Id
107. Facts which the Court considered "indicia of reliability" were: (I) Williams' statement
contained no express assertion of past fact; (2) Williams' knowledge of the identity of others in-
volved in the crime was well established by other independent evidence; (3) it was highly unlikely
that Williams' statement was based on faulty recollection; and (4) Williams had no reason to lie
to Evans and the circumstances under which he had made the statement indicated its truthfulness.
Id at 88-89.
108. Id at 83.
109. United States v. Leonard, 494 F.2d 955, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring
and dissenting).
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some personal revenge.IO
Further, there is authority in the fourth circuit for a Bruton objection
in conspiracy trials. In Joyner v. United States, "1 the court noted that
the trial court had wisely sustained an objection to the co-conspirator's
statement due to Bruton."12  In United States v. Truslow, "3 the court
made the following observation: "The United States contends that
Bruton does not apply to conspiracy cases. From what has been said, it
is apparent that we are of the opinion that it may.""' 4
Finally, in a concurring and dissenting opinion in United States v.
Payne,' Judge Widener noted that the Supreme Court"[had] never
considered in the context of admissibility of evidence in a federal court
whether or not the statement of a co-conspirator, uttered pursuant to
and in furtherance of the conspiracy, is in conffict with the confronta-
tion clause."' 16
With this springboard, the objection should be made in every con-
spiracy case in which a co-conspirator's statements are offered in the
absence of the declarant. In all likelihood, it will take the prosecution
and the court by surprise. The defense attorney should be prepared to
demonstrate why the inability to cross-examine the particular co-con-
spirator in his case strongly suggests that the jury will receive unreliable
evidence.
110. Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-Conspirator Exception in Criminal Prose-
cutions. 4 FunctionalAnalysis, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1378, 1396 (1972).
111. 547 F.2d 1199 (4th Cir. 1977).
112. Id at 1202 n.5. This objection came where the prosecution offered testimony concerning
prior statements before the co-conspirator who made the statements had taken the stand. The
court noted that once the declarant took the stand to testify, the Bruton objection was "no longer
seasonable." Id
113. 530 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1975).
114. Id at 262-63.
115. -492 F.2d 449 (4th Cir. 1974).
116. Id at 457 n.6A.
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